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Abstract
In this paper, a two-period game is constructed, where duopoly ¯rms choose
advertising strategies in the ¯rst period and compete in price or quantity in the
second period by maximizing the value of ¯rm equity. Using certainty equiva-
lence, we demonstrate the impacts of uncertainty and modes of competition on
duopoly ¯rms' optimal pricing, production, and advertising strategies. Equi-
librium price and quantity outcomes emerge as signi¯cantly di®erent from the
standard industrial organization model of pro¯t maximization. It turns out
that the common measurement of market power, the Lerner index, is generally
mis-stated. In contrast to the literature, we also ¯nd that ¯rms will optimally
switch from quantity to price competition either when advertising costs are
low, demand is high, or if idiosyncratic risk is reduced. A series of simulations
con¯rm these ¯ndings.
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This paper investigates ¯rm pricing and production decisions building from a model of
equity value maximization under imperfect competition. The vast majority of indus-
trial organizational theory is constructed on a rather simplistic premise that a ¯rm's
¯rst priority is to maximize pro¯ts. In practice, however, ¯rm managers driven by
equity-based incentive packages are more apt to focus equally on multiple objectives,
including pro¯tability, stability of pro¯ts, and creating conditions to foster strong
anticipated growth of pro¯ts. When viewed through the objective of equity mar-
ket valuation, di®erent market outcomes, interpretations, and policy-relevant factors
begin to emerge.
The basic single-period model of imperfectly competitive markets usually assumes
that the demand function is known with certainty. In cases when demand uncertainty
is allowed, it is generally assumed to be exogenous.1 This study considers whether
risk can be partially controlled, and if so, the corresponding implications in the equity
market for a ¯rm's capital. The justi¯cation for such a behavioral assumption rests
on the common observations of ¯rm behavior. To elaborate, we note that most ¯rms
use various tools to reduce risk exposure, including those available in the product
and ¯nancial markets. Such tools include: (1) hedging transactions in which ¯rms
manage risk exposure in commodities, interest rates, or currency °uctuations, (2)
R&D exploratory investment in which ¯rms face technological uncertainty, (3) supply
chain management strategies that secure uncertain supplies of raw inputs and manage
price and cost risks, and (4) advertising in which ¯rms face demand uncertainty in
the product market.
Point 4 is the focus of this paper. In particular, we focus on promotional e®orts
1For several aspects of decision making with uncertain demand, see, for example, Baron (1971),
Sandmo (1971), Leland (1972), and Klemperer and Meyer (1986).
1for otherwise identical products by ¯rms facing uncertain demand.2 We take note
of the endogenous control of risk evidenced when ¯rms use persuasive advertising to
di®erentiate their products. Promotion-induced brand identity is modeled to implic-
itly raise entry barriers and as such to cause more inelastic demand, which in turn
promotes more stable market shares and higher margins. As a result, ¯rms may deem
a product as contributing to capital value, because said product sales add to pro¯t
accumulation and stabilize current and future revenue.
To evaluate cash °ows from sales of a retail product, we use a certainty equiva-
lence approach. The risk-adjusted net present value of cash °ows, realized at the end
of the project, is established by using the single-period Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) due to Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). In it, systematic
(nondiversi¯able) risk measures how rates of return on the security issued by an in-
dividual ¯rm relate with that of the overall market portfolio. The underlying market
structure and/or the microeconomic determinants of the product market are given
scant attention in the context of CAPM. In reality, most ¯rms operate within an en-
vironment in which they interact with others continuously, as most market structures
are neither purely monopolistic nor perfectly competitive. It is apparent that the
strategic interactions among ¯rms may impact ¯nancial market variables. In their
seminal work, Subrahmanyam and Thomadakis (1980) successfully integrate real and
¯nancial views of a ¯rm. We consider the case of two ¯rms and discuss market
structure impacts on systematic risk.
Following Dixit (1979), this study introduces persuasive advertising in the duopoly
competition. Each ¯rm simultaneously chooses either a quantity to produce or a
price to charge, and faces constant marginal costs and no capacity constraints. The
2Of course, one might also consider the case that ¯rms invest in R&D or innovation activities
to di®erentiate products intrinsically. Evaluating the trade-o® between generating perceived versus
intrinsic product di®erentiations is also a topic worthy of future research.
2demand structure is linear and restricted to the case of substitute goods. In addition,
product di®erentiations are endogenous made through advertising. When ¯rms act to
reduce risk and maximize pro¯ts, signi¯cant di®erences in duopoly price and quantity
outcomes are possible.
Several related contributions focus on mode of competition and product di®erenti-
ation. Singh and Vives (1984) discuss the nature of duopoly competition in Bertrand
and Cournot markets. For the case of substitutes, they conclude that, when compared
to Bertrand competition Cournot competition always yields higher prices and higher
pro¯ts, but lower social welfare. Klemperer and Meyer (1986) consider the role that
uncertainty plays when ¯rms seek to determine the choice variables in a single-period
context. The present study is di®erent from theirs and emphasizes endogenous un-
certainty and product di®erentiation. While Motta (1993) also deals with di®erent
modes of competition, his study considers only the case of vertical and endogenous
product di®erentiation.
Several comparative views of persuasive and informative advertising appear in the
literature. According to Kaldor (1950) and Bain (1956), persuasive advertising is so-
cially wasteful because it changes tastes and enhances brand loyalty by subjective or
perceived product di®erentiation. Alternatively, Stigler (1961) and Telser (1964) em-
phasize the informative role of advertising, and hold that advertising primarily a®ects
demand by conveying information, lowering search costs, and increasing competition.
Considerable theoretical research has examined the role of informative advertising.
For example, see Nelson (1974), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), and Bagwell and Ramey (1988).3 Relatively little theoretical work has investi-
gated the role of purely persuasive advertising. Additionally, this literature generally
3Stigler and Becker (1977) proposed the concept of complementary advertising. See Bagwell
(2001) for a survey of di®erent views of advertising.
3lacks cohesion and fail to provide conclusive evidence about just how advertising may
a®ect consumers' preferences. Becker and Murphy (1993) assume that advertising
enters into consumers' utility function and that advertising is complementary to the
consumption of the advertised product. More directly, various studies assume that
advertising \shifts demand" for the advertised goods, for example, Dixit and Norman
(1978, 1979, 1980), Fisher and McGowan (1979), and Shapiro (1980).
This paper explicitly models how advertising fosters product di®erentiation and
then explores the subsequent impacts on product demand and revenue shocks to a
¯rm. One closely related model is o®ered in von der Fehr and Stevik (1998), where the
authors distinguish the e®ects of persuasive advertising on preferences in three ways:
increases willingness to pay, changes ideal product variety, and increases perceived
product di®erences. Our model di®ers from theirs in at least four aspects. First,
this study assumes a ¯rm's main objective to be asset value maximization, while in
theirs it is pro¯t maximization. Second, we consider various modes of competition,
whereas they consider price competition alone. Third, we additionally investigate
the impact of uncertainty on ¯rms' optimal advertising strategies. Finally, we use
the linear demand of representative agents as opposed to a linear Hotelling model of
di®erentiated goods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a model in
which advertising may create subjective product di®erentiation, compares quantity
and price competition, and explores the impacts of advertising on product di®eren-
tiation and risk reduction, and then presents comparative statics and simulations of
the model. Finally, section 3 o®ers conclusive remarks and suggestions for future
research.
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Figure 1: The Model Timeline
2 The Model
The model in this study is a two-stage sequential duopoly game. In the ¯rst period,
each ¯rm di®erentiates its single product through persuasive advertising. In the
second period, each ¯rm produces its product with two factors of production: labor
and capital. Both factors are assumed to arrive at the ¯rm from perfectly competitive
factor markets. Assume that while each ¯rm faces uncertain demand, a constant
marginal cost is known with certainty. Both ¯rms' revenues are subject to a random
shock that neither can observe when the strategic variables are chosen.
Figure 1 presents the timeline. Firm i ¯nances the entire project by borrowing
from the investment bank, with a risk-free interest rate r.4 The borrowed cash in the
¯rst period is mi = Ki+g(Ai), where Ki is ¯rm i's capital stock for production, Ai is
the advertising level, and g(Ai) is the cost of advertising. Firm i learns g(Ai) before
choosing Ai.5 Note that capital is a numeraire in the model. In the second period,
the wealth of ¯rm i is Wi = ~ Ri ¡ wLi ¡ (1 + r)mi, where ~ Ri is the total revenue of
¯rm i, w is the wage rate, and Li is the input of labor. As a result, the expected
4This study does not deal with the con°icts of interest between debt-holders and equity-holders.
We assume that the decisions are made by owner-managers or that there exists no agency problem
between investors and managers.
5The timing of learning g(Ai) is crucial in the model. If ¯rms know the cost structure of adver-
tising after choosing Ai, they must have an expectation over g(Ai). This creates issues of incomplete
information.





~ Ri ¡ wLi
1 + r
¡ Ki ¡ g(Ai): (1)






That is, we assume that the ¯rms build up some amount of capital stock6 in the
¯rst period in order to pay for the employment of labor in the second period. In
other words, capital is purchased in advance of production, while labor is purchased
as production proceeds. Finally, we assume wLi = cXi, where, for simplicity, c is the
constant marginal cost of both ¯rms and Xi is quantity produced.
On the revenue side, ¯rm i's total revenue is given by
~ Ri = piXi(1 + ~ e);E(~ e) = 0;V ar(~ e) = ¾
2
e; (2)
where pi is the price and the random variable ~ e is an idiosyncratic shock on the
revenue of ¯rm i. Without loss of generality, it is assumed to have mean of zero. ¾e
is the standard deviation of the shock. It is further assumed for every demand curve
that the support of the noise is small enough so that negative revenue never occurs.
Suppose ¯rms face a linear inverse demand function7 in period 2.
pi = ® ¡ (b ¡ °)Xi ¡ °Xj; b=2 ¸ ° ¸ 0;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (3)
° ¸ 0 implies directly the case of substitutes and b=2 ¸ ° implies that the own e®ect
(b ¡ °) is at least as large as the cross e®ect (°).
6Ki is su±ciently large, so no capacity constraint exists. On the other hand, it cannot be too
large for non-negative pro¯ts. The ¯xed capital stock in the ¯rst period is assumed. The relevant
extensions are discussed in the last section.
7See also Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives (1984), and Vives (1999).
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Figure 2: Two E®ects of a Decrease in ° on Demand
According to this setting, there exist two e®ects when ° changes: a shift in de-
mand and a rotation of the demand curve. For example, when products are more
di®erentiated, ° decreases, and the residual demand for ¯rm i is
pi = (® ¡ °Xj) ¡ (b ¡ °)Xi;
where both the intercept and the absolute value of slope of demand are increased.
These two e®ects are depicted in Figure 2.
It is worthwhile to note that the aggregate demand in the industry does not change
when ° varies. As a result, any activities engaging in changing product di®erentia-
tion { for instance, advertising in this study { change the substitutability between
products, but do not a®ect the size of the market.
We also de¯ne ± = °=(b ¡ °) to model the degree of (horizontal) product di®er-
entiation.8 The more di®erentiated the products (± ! 0), the smaller the e®ect of
change in quantity (price) of brand j on the price (quantity) of brand i. Note that
by assumption 0 · ± · 1. Therefore, (3) can be rewritten as
pi = ® ¡
b
1 + ±
(Xi + ±Xj); 1 ¸ ± ¸ 0;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (4)
8Note that the de¯nition here di®ers from the common setting seen in, for example, Shy (1995).
7Let the degree of di®erentiation be ± = ¹ ±¡Ai¡Aj, where ¹ ± is the initial degree of
di®erentiation, and Ai and Aj are the advertising levels of ¯rm i and j respectively.9
Because we consider the case where products are ex-ante homogeneous, ¹ ± = 1.10 Intu-
itively, each ¯rm has more market power when its product is more di®erentiated and
as such it is reasonable to expect that both ¯rms will tacitly cooperate in advertising
so as to generate higher equity values. This expectation is supported later in the
paper. On the cost side, suppose the cost of advertising is the same for both ¯rms





; i = 1;2; (5)
where ¹ ¸ 0, n > 1.11 Note that a ¯xed cost of advertising is assumed. That is, this
cost is sunk in period 1, and does not vary with the quantity produced in period 2.
Turning now to capital value issues, we assume a ¯nancial market characterized
by the Sharpe-Lintner equilibrium. That is,
E(~ ri) = r + ¯i [E(~ rm) ¡ r]; (6)
where E(~ ri) and E(~ rm) are expected rates of return of asset i and market portfolio,
respectively, while ¯i is systematic risk de¯ned in (9a). Thus, by CAPM, the ¯rm's
market value is given by:
vi =





; where ¸ =




¾m is the standard deviation of the return of market portfolio, and ¸ is the market
price of risk per unit of variance.12
9Considering a symmetric equilibrium Aj = Ai, 0 · Aj = Ai · ¹ ±=2.
10We can relax this assumption to see the e®ect of the initial degree of di®erentiation on the optimal
advertising level. Further, each consumer may have a di®erent degree of initial di®erentiation, which
we may characterize by employing a distribution on the initial di®erentiation. Nevertheless, our
qualitative results still hold under these extensive settings.
11We use a quadratic cost function in our simulations; that is, n = 2.
12Dixit and Pindyck (1994) use the New York Stock Exchange Index as the market, E(~ rm)¡r ¼
8Because Cov( ~ Ri; ~ rm) = Cov(~ e; ~ rm)Ri and wLi = cXi,
vi =















where certainty equivalent Á = 1¡¸Cov(~ e; ~ rm) = 1¡¸½¾e¾m and ½ is the correlation
coe±cient between the revenue shock and the return on market portfolio. In general,
Á 2 [0;1]13 and d = c=Á adjusted marginal cost, provided that Á 6= 0.14 To keep the
model as concise as possible, we focus on the positive ½ and assume ® > d.











Equation (8) leads to Claim 1:
Claim 1 Under pro¯t maximization, the common measurement of market power,
Lerner index, is generally overstated.
Claim 1 is straightforward given that d ¸ c. The equity model carries an added
cost associated with the risk pro¯le of the ¯rm. Failure to account for these costs
suggests that researchers will either ¯nd market power when none is present (Type I
error), or will overstate the negative welfare impacts of market power.
By CAPM, systematic risk is de¯ned by
¯i =
Cov(~ ri; ~ rm)
V ar(~ rm)
=
Cov( ~ Ri; ~ rm)
viV ar(~ rm)
=
RiCov(~ e; ~ rm)
viV ar(~ rm)
: (9a)
0:08 and standard deviation ¾m ¼ 0:2, so ¸ ¼ 2. Note that they measure the market price of risk
based on per unit of standard deviation. See also Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Brealey and Myers
(2000).
13A parallel literature studies the decisions of ¯rms under uncertainty. The ¯rm is assumed to have
a utility function and to maximize expected utility in the sense of von Neumann-Morgenstern, for
example, Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972). This approach is justi¯ed in Sandmo (1971). However,
it remains di±cult to construct a utility function for the ¯rm, see Fama and Miller (1972), pp. 67-68.
14We may incorporate cost uncertainty in equation (7) by de¯ning µ as a certainty equivalent
parameter on the cost side. For a strictly convex cost function, µ > 1. After rede¯ning d = cµ=Á,
equation (7) still holds true as long as two sources of uncertainty are independent of each other. The
new adjusted marginal cost is higher than the original one. However, because we assume the cost
function is linear, we need not adjust the cost uncertainty.
















Let Cov(~ e; ~ rm) = ½¾e¾m and V ar(~ rm) = ¾2




















































As discussed in the introduction, most ¯rms seek to stabilize pro¯ts and manage risk.
The next section will further explore the role of beta and risk reduction.
Risk Reduction
By CAPM speci¯ed in (6), there are two things only we need to know when evaluating
an asset's expected return; i.e., the risk premium of the whole market E(~ rm)¡r; and
the asset's beta. One important observation is that the portion of the asset return
leads to no risk premium and its risk can be diversi¯ed as long as the risk is not
correlated with the market. As a result, not all of an asset's idiosyncratic risk is
taken into account for the expected return, but the part correlated with the market
portfolio; that is, ½¾e illustrated in equation (10a). While the risk-free rate and risk
premium of the market portfolio are generally given in the broad market, by (6) beta
o®ers a method to measure an asset's nondiversi¯able risk.
Intuitively, it is not di±cult to see how changes in ½;¾e; or ½¾e a®ect ¯i: Firms
usually di®erentiate their products so as to maintain stable market shares and revenue
streams. In turn, ¯rms bear less risk when the revenue streams are less volatile and/or
the revenue shock is less correlated with market portfolio's return generated through
product di®erentiation.
10On the other hand, decisions on the production side (quantities to produce or
prices to charge) also may alter the nondiversi¯able risk. Under the current setting,
the systematic risk is inversely related to a ¯rm's market power measure, certainty
equivalent Lerner index. To better understand the impacts of production decisions
on risk, we highlight the role of production costs, as is summarized in Claim 2.
Claim 2 To link the ¯nancial market with the production market, production costs
cannot be ignored.
In much of the industrial organization literature, production costs are normalized
to zero for simplicity and then ignored. However, the linkage between the ¯nancial
market and the production market cannot be clearly characterized if we neglect the
e®ect of production cost. If c = 0, then d = 0; implying that ¯i is independent of a
¯rm's pricing strategy.
Since risk reduction through ½ and ¾e is straightforward, we will focus mainly on
production decisions. That is, we will investigate how ¯rms maximize market values
and minimize risks through product di®erentiation, by holding ½ and ¾e constant in
the basic model. In the case with additional bene¯ts from reducing ½ and ¾e, the
incentives to di®erentiate products are enhanced.
Di®erent Modes of Competition in Period Two
This section analyzes the equity valuation model under price and quantity competi-
tion. As usual, the two-stage game is solved via backward induction.
Under quantity competition, both ¯rms choose quantity strategies simultaneously,













(Xi + ±Xj) ¡ d
¸
: (11)




= 2Xi + ±Xj: (12)
Equation (12) implicitly de¯nes ¯rm i's reaction function. Solving for optimal quan-









® + (1 + ±)d
2 + ±
: (13)




















® + (1 + ±)d
¸
: (15)
Turning now to competition in price space, and following the procedures used for































®(1 ¡ ±) + d
¸
: (18)
A simple and key ¯nding emerges from equations (13), (14), (16) and (17) and is
summarized in the following proposition (see the proof in the appendix).
Proposition 1 Firms facing uncertain demand behave less competitively than those
facing no uncertainty, ceteris paribus. Value-maximizing ¯rms produce less and
charge higher prices, but earn lower cash °ows.
Value-maximizing ¯rms behave less competitively no matter which type of com-
petition (Cournot or Bertrand) is adopted because those ¯rms are concerned with
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Figure 3: E®ects of a Decrease in Certainty Equivalent
pro¯ts as well as risks. After accounting for the risk, ceteris paribus, the marginal
revenue resulting from producing more for value maximization is less than that for
pro¯t maximization. Figure 3 demonstrates how changes in certainty equivalent a®ect
equilibrium quantity and price, for Cournot and Bertrand competitions alike, provided
that the degree of product di®erentiation is exogenous. The results of proposition 1
are supported.
Di®erent Degrees of Product Di®erentiation
There exist three essential but standard results derived from the range of advertising
costs. First, when advertising costs are prohibitive (¹ ! 1 in (5), ± = 1), the
competition will drive prices down until said prices equal either the marginal costs
under the price competition senario15 or typical Cournot results under the quantity
competition senario.
Second, when ¯rms are able to di®erentiate their products without incurring any
15Under price competition, from (17) and (18) each ¯rm has zero value and incurs in¯nite system-
atic risk. This result is not likely the case. Economists usually ignore the ¯nancial variables as well
as the interplay between ¯nancial and product markets. This example suggests that the standard
Bertrand duopoly model with homogeneous products is not appropriate if we incorporate concerns
about ¯nancial variables.
13costs, i.e., ¹ = 0, they will di®erentiate goods such that their products are independent
of each other (± = 0), which obviously generates the monopoly outcome for price and
quantity competition. The results of price competition and quantity competition
coincide and represent the joint value maximization. Each ¯rm performs just like a
monopolist with its product.16
Finally, for intermediate cases where 0 < ¹ < 1, (13), (14), (16), and (17) imply
that both Bertrand and Cournot ¯rms prefer to produce more di®erentiated goods.
The more di®erentiated the products, the less ±, and consequently the more vc and
vB.
Therefore, comparing Cournot competition with Bertrand competition, the fol-
lowing proposition emerges (see the proof in the appendix).
Proposition 2 Suppose ¯rms face the same demand, and that the degree of product
di®erentiation is exogenous,
(a) We arrive at the standard industrial organization results. That is, Cournot ¯rms
produce less quantity but charge higher prices than Bertrand ¯rms, and therefore ob-
tain higher pro¯ts. The di®erences between Bertrand and Cournot in terms of prices,
quantities, and pro¯ts are widest when products are homogeneous (± = 1) and small-
est when products are totally di®erentiated (± = 0).
(b) When ¯rms maximize capital value, the di®erences in prices, quantities, and prof-
its are less divergent than the standard industrial organization results of duopolistic
competition.
16It is also interesting to compare our model with the spatial competition of a \linear city." In
terms of spatial competition (e.g., Hotelling model), the equilibrium has the two ¯rms locating at
the two extremes of the city (maximal di®erentiation). Since each ¯rm incurs no costs when choosing
the location, each ¯rm locates as far as possible from its rival in order to avoid triggering a low price,
and thus price competition is not so harsh. Assuming representative consumers in the markets allows
us to analyze the price competition as well as the quantity competition, and then to study their
di®erences without concern for market coverage.
14The Cournot ¯rms produce less, charge higher prices, and enjoy more ¯rm value
than the Bertrand ¯rms. While similar to ¯ndings by Singh and Vives (1984), these
results may not hold if ¯rms are able to choose degrees of di®erentiation for their
products. That is, as shown below, ¯rms may choose di®erent levels of di®erentiation
under di®erent modes of competition, and therefore may charge higher prices and
garner more revenue under the price competition in some ranges of parameters.
The Advertising Game - Optimal Degree of Di®erentiation
Up to this point, we have evaluated only the way uncertainty a®ects quantity and
price setting outcomes in a capital value model. Now we move backwards to period
1, in which optimal advertising and thus the degree of di®erentiation for each mode
of competition are solved.
In period 1, ¯rm i chooses Ai, given its rival j's strategy Aj. The objective function
is to maximize
NPVi = vi ¡ Ki ¡ g(Ai): (19)
Substituting (14) and (5) into (19) yields the net present discounted value of the
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; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j:










1 ¡ Ai ¡ Aj
(3 ¡ Ai ¡ Aj)3 ¡ ¹A
n¡1
i = 0; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (20)












; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j:










1 ¡ Ai ¡ Aj
(1 + Ai + Aj)3 ¡¹A
n¡1
i = 0; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j: (21)
In a symmetric equilibrium, Aj = Ai. Solving (20) for Ai and Aj, we obtain opti-
mal advertising, associated price, quantity, value of ¯rm, and systematic risk under
quantity competition. Similarly, we can solve (21) for optimal advertising and other
variables under price competition. Basically, the solution for Ai involves a quartic
equation in each ¯rst order condition if a quadratic advertising cost function (n = 2)
is assumed. It is not possible to obtain a closed-form solution from equations (20) or
(21). Therefore, we will proceed toward a simple simulation approach. Before doing
so, ¯rst we examine the comparative statics of changes in the exogenous parameters
on endogenous variables in the system.
Comparative Statics and Simulations
This section explores the e®ects of changes in the exogenous parameters on equilib-
rium prices, quantities, and advertising levels as well as on ¯rm's value and systematic
risk. These e®ects are most easily derived by di®erentiating equations (20) and (21)





Ai(3 ¡ Ai ¡ Aj)3





Ai(1 + Ai + Aj)3
1 ¡ Ai ¡ Aj
: (23)








We want to see how the change in ®;b;½¾e;¾m, E(~ rm) ¡ r, c, or ¹ impacts Ai.




@z , where z = ®, b, ½¾e, ¾m,
16E(~ rm) ¡ r, c, and ¹, the following lemma is necessary to obtain a monotonic impact
on the optimal advertising level (see the proof in the appendix).
Lemma 1 The right sides of equations (22) and (23) are monotonically increasing
if Ai 2 [0;0:5).
The unique role of advertising is worth considering here. In our model, advertising
serves as a vehicle to shift and rotate the demand curve. Because of this speci¯c
setting, the income e®ect never dominates the substitution e®ect even when the slope
of the demand curve is su±ciently high. As such, advertising performs like a normal
good. The above lemma indicates that, subject to the costs, as a rule, advertising is
always bene¯cial to the value of a ¯rm.
Impacts on Ai
With lemma 1, we can examine the impacts of z on Ai (see the proof in the
appendix).
Proposition 3 Assuming that ® > d, an increase in ® or ¾m will increase the equi-
librium Ai, while an increase in b, ½¾e, E(~ rm)¡r, c, or ¹ will decrease the equilibrium
Ai.
The results of proposition 3 are presented in column (1) of Table 1. Proposition
3 shows that the equilibrium advertising level increases as its marginal bene¯t raises,
whereas the converse is true if the marginal bene¯t of advertising declines.
Taking ® as an example, an increase in consumers' willingness to pay ® leads
to an increase in the equilibrium advertising level. This is because a shift out in
demand tends to raise the yield on a given ¯rm's advertising, as marginal bene¯ts
of advertising are more likely to increase. In addition, because ± = 1 ¡ Ai ¡ Aj, ±
decreases as Ai or Aj increases. In fact, @±
@z = ¡
2@Ai
@z in the symmetric equilibrium,
17where z is any exogenous variable. With these two facts in hand, we are able to
examine the changes of the variables noted in equations (13)-(15) and (16)-(18).
Table 1 Comparative Statics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A p X v ¯
® Bertrand + + ? + ¡
Cournot + + ? + ¡
b Bertrand ¡ ¡ ? ¡ +
Cournot ¡ ¡ ? ¡ +
½¾e Bertrand ¡ ?(¡) ?(+) ¡ +
Cournot ¡ ?(¡) ?(+) ¡ +
¾m Bertrand + ?(+) ?(¡) + ¡
Cournot + ?(+) ?(¡) + ¡
E(~ rm) ¡ r Bertrand ¡ ?(¡) ?(+) ¡ +
Cournot ¡ ?(¡) ?(+) ¡ +
¹ Bertrand ¡ ¡ ? ¡ +
Cournot ¡ ¡ ? ¡ +
c Bertrand ¡ ? ? ¡ +
Cournot ¡ ? ? ¡ +
¤ \?(¡)" and \?(+)" denote that the impact is generally
undetermined, but more likely to be negative or positive,
respectively.
Changes in ®, b, and ¹
Next, the e®ects of changes in ® under Cournot and Bertrand competition are
explored. We summarize the results in the following proposition (see the proof in the
appendix).
Proposition 4 If consumers' willingness to pay (®) increases, under either Cournot
or Bertrand competition:
(a) the equilibrium advertising level, price, and ¯rm's value increase, but the system-
atic risk decreases, and




@® ;j = c;B) depends on the impact on
18the equilibrium advertising level (
@Ai






















An increase in consumers' willingness to pay generates additional ¯rm pro¯ts,
and also reduces systematic risk. Firms engage in more advertising and produce
more di®erentiated goods. However, the in°uence on quantity is ambiguous because
it depends on changes in levels of advertising. Changes in advertising create two
e®ects: shifts in demand and rotation of the demand curve. For an outward shift,
the demand curve will generate an increase in price and quantity. Meanwhile, a less
elastic demand curve will increase price but decrease quantity. These two e®ects o®set
each other for equilibrium quantity. Obviously, when the rotation e®ect is small, the
price and quantity will increase.
By applying similar logic, we employ the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If the slope of demand curve (b) or the cost parameter of advertising
(¹) increases, under either Cournot or Bertrand competition:
(a) the equilibrium advertising level, price, and ¯rm's value decrease, but the system-
atic risk increases, and




@z ; z = b;¹; j = c;B) depend on
the impacts on the equilibrium advertising level (
@Ai
@z ). These conditions are given in
equations (27) and (28).
19From equations (22) and (23), it is easy to see that b and ¹ play the same role when
we compute the impacts of their changes. Similar to proposition 4, the conditions in





















where z = b;¹.













and ´x¹ and ´A¹ are de¯ned in a similar way, then together with ± = 1 ¡ 2Ai in
equilibrium, conditions (27) and (28) have alternative expressions as follows:
´
c
xz < 0; if ´Az > ¡









where z = b;¹. Of course, readers may ¯nd similar formulas for (25) and (26).
Changes in ½¾e, E(~ rm) ¡ r, and ¾m
From equation (24), we know ½¾e, E(~ rm) ¡ r, and ¾m serve similar roles, and
this changes ¯rms' certainty equivalence, Á, as we derive the comparative statics.17
Therefore, we de¯ne the risk elasticity of quantity ´xÁ, the risk elasticity of price ´pÁ,




















@z , equation (24), and proposition 3, ´±Á < 0. Thus, we have lemma
2 (see the proof in the appendix).
17The only di®erence is from the computation of the e®ect on ¯. However, the conclusion is the
same.
20Lemma 2 Under either Cournot or Bertrand competition,
(a) ´xÁ is bounded above, while ´pÁ is bounded below.




Lemma 2 indicates that e®ects on Xi and pi from a change in the risk attitude { or,
equivalently, from certainty equivalence { cannot be extremely positive or negative,
respectively. It is quite intuitive that ´xÁ (´pÁ) is bounded above (below). This
implies that the less averse the risk attitude, the less the quantity produced and the
higher the price charged. If an increase in Á can induce a large increase in optimal
advertising, i.e., ´±Á or @±
@Á is signi¯cantly negative, then ´xÁ is negative while ´pÁ is
positive. This assumption will dramatically simplify our analysis. The facts that ´xÁ
is bounded above and that ´pÁ is bounded below are also supported by the result that
@vi
@Á > 0.
We summarize the impacts of ½¾e and E(~ rm) ¡ r as well as ¾m in the following
proposition (see the proof in the appendix).
Proposition 6 Under either Cournot or Bertrand competition:
(a) an increase in ½¾e (i.e. the correlation coe±cient between the project and the
market portfolio, multiplied by the volatility of the project), or an increase in the
excess rate of return on the market portfolio (E(~ rm) ¡ r), decreases the equilibrium
advertising level as well as ¯rm's value, but increases the systematic risk. Meanwhile,
changes in prices (quantities) are generally undetermined but more likely to be negative
(positive) with signi¯cantly positive @±
@(½¾e) or @±
@(E(~ rm)¡r).
(b) an increase in the volatility of market portfolio (¾m) increases the equilibrium
advertising level and ¯rm's value, but decreases the systematic risk, while changes in
prices (quantities) are generally undetermined but more likely to be positive (negative),
21with signi¯cantly negative @±
@¾m.
The above proposition provides the link from the risk attitude Á to other related
variables. When the certainty equivalence rises as the project risk decreases, the
excess rate of return on the market portfolio decreases, or the volatility of market
portfolio increases, while the relative bene¯ts of the project are increasing but the
systematic risk is decreasing.
Finally, let us deal with the case of changes in the marginal cost of production c.
Changes in c
The e®ects of a change in the marginal cost of production c can be presented in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Under either Cournot or Bertrand competition, when the marginal
cost of production c increases:
(a) the equilibrium advertising level and ¯rm's value decrease but the systematic risk
increases, and








@c ;j = c;B) depend on
the impact on the equilibrium advertising level (
@Ai
@c ). The conditions are shown in
equations (31) and (32).
Proof. (a) We omit the proof of part (a), as it is similar to the above example.





























Table 1 presents the results of comparative statics. The analysis shows that ex-
ogenous variables have clear relations with the optimal advertising level, value of
22¯rm, and systematic risk, whereas impacts on the price and quantity are varied and
some e®ects are undetermined. However, the above discussions permits us to narrow
down the results; for example, with signi¯cantly negative @±
@Á, the e®ects on the price
(quantity) are negative (positive) for ½¾e and E(~ rm) ¡ r, but positive (negative) for
¾m.
In the next section we investigate some simulations to determine what the sym-
metric pure-strategy equilibrium looks like, as the analytical results are not available.
Simulations
As discussed in the comparative statics, b and ¹ serve a similar role, as do ¾m,
½¾e, and E(~ rm)¡r. We conduct the simulations in which changes in ®, ¹, ½, and ¾e
are examined.
In our simulations, the parameters of the base case include b = 1, r = 0:05,
c = 0:1, ¾m = 0:2, ¸ = 2, ¾e = 0:2, ½ = 0:5, ® = 1, ¹ = 0:1, and n = 2. Therefore,







which is less than the case of certain demand (i.e. (1 ¡ 0:1)2=(1 + 0:05) = 0:7714).
The simulation results are presented in Table 2, where (a) ¹ is from 0 to 0.2, (b)
® is from 0.5 to 1.5, (c) ½ is from 0 to 1, (d) ¾e is from 0 to 0.4, and (e) c is from 0 to
0.2. The change in ¹ captures the e®ect of changes in advertising costs, the change
in ® captures the e®ect of shift in demand, the change in ½ or ¾e captures the impact
of changes in the revenue shock, and ¯nally, the change in c captures the e®ect of
changes in the production cost. The results con¯rm the previous comparative statics,
and o®er some general observations in the following claim.
Claim 3 From a perspective that considers the comparisons between Bertrand com-
petition and Cournot competition, the simulation results also indicate the following
23observations:
(1) Bertrand ¯rms engage in more advertising activities.
(2) In general, Cournot ¯rms enjoy more net present value. However, this relation is
reversed when the marginal cost of advertising is small, consumers' willingness to pay
is large, production cost is small, and/or risk is small. For example, the case occurs
when ¹ · 0:08 in Table 2(a), ® ¸ 1:1 in Table 2(b), and c · 0:03 in Table 2(e).
(3) An increase in ® or a decrease in ½¾e, c, or ¹ tend to bene¯t Bertrand ¯rms more
than Cournot ¯rms. This can be shown by taking the di®erence between any two
corresponding pairs of entries in Table 2.
The Extensive Models
In this section, we extend the model to the extent that advertising can also reduce
the risk parameter of revenue shock ¾e and enhance consumers' willingness to pay ®.
Speci¯cally, advertising reduces the risk of revenue shock inversely to that illustrated
in a mean-preserving spread while it shifts outwards the demand curve by enhancing
the willingness to pay. First, we explore the case of the risk reduction.
Reduction of ¾e
With the setting that advertising reduces revenue shock parameter ¾e or changes
the correlation coe±cient between the undertaken project and the market portfolio ½,
we may interpret advertising activities in a more general way. That is, in addition to
changes in product di®erentiation, Ai can be advertising or any investment in R&D
or innovation activities that can either predict the revenue shock more accurately or
insulate the undertaken project from market shocks. Both scenarios act as hedging
activities. Therefore, this implies that Ai may reduce ¾e de¯ned in equation (2)
and/or the correlation coe±cient between the undertaken project and the market
portfolio ½.
24The following discussion addresses the e®ect on the reduction of ¾e only by taking
½ as given. We assume the e®ect is characterized by equation (33) to facilitate the
illustration.
¾e = ¾e exp(± ¡ 1) = ¾e exp[¡(Ai + Aj)]: (33)
Under this setting, the advertising is assumed to reduce the impact of revenue shock
inversely to that seen in a mean-preserving spread. That is, the advertising decreases
the volatility of the project and the expected value of the project is unchanged. Note
that by de¯ning the reduction of ¾e as ¢¾e = ¾e ¡ ¾e; we have @¢¾e=@± > 0 and
@2¢¾e=@±
2 < 0: This captures the idea of positive but diminishing marginal bene¯ts
of ¾e reduction.
As discussed earlier in this paper, we expect that the incentives to di®erentiate
products will be enhanced when additional bene¯ts of advertising result from reducing
½ and ¾e. This expectation can be examined as follows. The ¯rst order conditions
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2 ¡ d
2)¸½¾e¾m exp[¡(Ai + Aj)]
¾
= 0;
where i;j = 1;2;i 6= j:
The positive additional terms within the brackets of (34) and (35) indicate the
marginal bene¯ts from ¾e reduction through advertising. Suppose that Ac; AB; Acr
and ABrare solutions to equations (20), (21), (34) and (35), respectively. It is easy
to examine that Ac < Acr and AB < ABr.
Increase of Willingness to Pay ®
25In the basic model, equation (3) shows that changes in substitutability between
products caused by advertising do not change the aggregate demand in the industry.
We analyze the model for incorporating the change in willingness to pay by shifting the
demand curve outwards in addition to the change in perceived product di®erentiation.
As a result, advertising has impacts on both horizontal and vertical di®erentiations.
This implies that advertising may generate more bene¯ts by expanding the market
size or boosting consumers' willingness to pay, which is characterized by the intercept
of demand function ®. Suppose that
®i = ®i + Ãi(Ai) + »Ãj(Aj);
where ®i is ex ante willingness to pay. The ex post willingness to pay is a®ected
by both ¯rms' advertising levels. We assume Ã
0
i(Ai) > 0; Ã
00





j(Aj) < 0. However, the marginal e®ect of ¯rm j's advertising (characterized
by »Ã
0
j(Aj)) is ambiguous because it may combine somewhat like the predatory and
spillover e®ects of advertising introduced by Roberts and Samuelson (1988). It turns
out that we adopt a particular speci¯cation for the purpose of tractability in the
numerical simulations.18





Under this setting, the cross-e®ect of advertising is negative as we try to model
that the advertising of ¯rm j may o®set the impact of ¯rm i's advertising. There-
fore, in addition to cooperating in the horizontal di®erentiation, ¯rms' advertising
strategies compete with each other in the vertical di®erentiation. The advertisement
may take a form, such as \our product is very di®erent from theirs, their product
is bad, and the quality of ours is way better than theirs." Furthermore, the ratio of
18See Gasmi et al. (1992) for this speci¯cation and for more discussions about predatory and
spillover e®ects.
26cross-e®ect of advertising to the own-e®ect is assumed to be the degree of horizontal
product di®erentiation. This assumption indicates that the cross-e®ect in (36) is the
same as the e®ect on the horizontal di®erentiation. The e®ects of ¯rms' advertising
strategies may o®set each other, but the negative impact from the rival diminishes as
the products become more di®erentiated.
As in equations (34) and (35), Cournot and Bertrand ¯rms's additional marginal
bene¯ts from increasing consumers' willingness to pay are
2Á
b(1 + r)
2 ¡ Ai ¡ Aj





















This leads to conclusions similar to those from (34) and (35). The higher ad-
vertising levels are induced under either Bertrand or Cournot competition because
advertising generates additional bene¯ts in the extensive models, i.e., advertising re-
duces idiosyncratic risk and increases consumers' willingness to pay. As a result, ¯rms
enjoy increased market values, but incur less systematic risks. While not reported
here, the simulation results of the extensive models con¯rm these assessments.
Based on this discussion, it is straightforward to extend the model to combine the
e®ects of an increase in ® with those of a decrease in ¾e. This tends to bene¯t ¯rms
more by increasing their values and decreasing their systematic risks.
3 Conclusions and Extensions
In this study, we developed a model of equity value maximization that allows persua-
sive advertising to in°uence the risk facing ¯rms and thereby a®ecting the competition
between duopolists. This study makes six major ¯ndings. First, we showed that the
traditional Lerner index is generally overstated when systematic ¯nancial market risk
is ignored. This result may have policy implications for antitrust authorities. The
27main question raised here is whether conventional antitrust analysis under pro¯t max-
imization overstates welfare losses due to market power and/or results in Type I error
regarding the condition of the industry. The empirical implications of this ¯nding are
the focus of a companion study of the U.S. margarine and butter markets (Wang,
Stiegert, and Dhar, 2005). Second, the model reveals that the common practice of
ignoring production cost acts to disengage key linkages between ¯nancial and prod-
uct markets. Third, when ¯rms can reduce their risk by di®erentiating products, the
marginal bene¯ts of advertising will rise. Consequently, ¯rms advertise more, enjoy
an increased cash °ow, and incur fewer systematic risks. These results apply under
Bertrand or Cournot competition alike, but are generally ignored when pro¯ts are
assumed to be the sole objective of the ¯rm.
Fourth, the conventional results from pure pro¯t maximization suggest that Bertrand
¯rms always engage in a higher degree of competition than Cournot ¯rms, and as such
that they earn fewer pro¯ts and incur higher systematic risks. Our model suggests
that this scenario may not hold true when advertising costs are low, demand is high,
and/or when idiosyncratic risk is reduced. These results may have empirical implica-
tions and at minimum suggest the need to test the mode of competition in industries
of branded or highly di®erentiated products.
Our model presented a sequence of lemmas and propositions in section 2. We ¯rst
proved that both Bertrand and Cournot ¯rms prefer to produce more di®erentiated
goods in Proposition 1. Proposition 2 showed that when the degree of product dif-
ferentiation is exogenous, ¯rms prefer Cournot competition to Bertrand competition,
and the di®erences of prices, quantities, and ¯rm values are less divergent when ¯rms
maximize capital value.
Because advertising is assumed to be a vehicle to shift and rotate the demand
curve, Lemma 1 showed that the income e®ect of advertising never dominates the
28substitution e®ect. That is, advertising performs like a normal good, and as such
subject to the associated costs, advertising is bene¯cial to the value of ¯rm. With
lemma 1, the comparative statics are easy to manage. Propositions 3 to 7 explored
how changes in exogenous variables can impact equilibrium advertising, price, quan-
tity, systematic risk, and ¯rm value. The exogenous variables include consumers'
willingness to pay (®), the slope of the demand curve (b), the cost parameter of ad-
vertising (¹), the correlation between the undertaken project and the market portfolio
multiplied by the volatility of the project (½¾e), the excess rate of return on the mar-
ket portfolio (E(~ rm)¡r), the volatility of the market portfolio (¾m), and the marginal
cost of production (c). Table 1 summarized the results of comparative statics.
Fifth, the numerical simulations con¯rmed the ¯nding that Bertrand ¯rms engage
in more advertising activities than Cournot ¯rms, and that the changes in exogenous
variables a®ect Bertrand ¯rms more. In addition, Table 2 showed that Bertrand
¯rms enjoy more net present value when the marginal cost of advertising is small,
consumers' willingness to pay is large, production cost is small, and/or risk is small.
Finally, we extend the model to investigate the cases that advertising can also
reduce revenue shock and enhance consumers' willingness to pay. The higher ad-
vertising levels realized under either Cournot or Bertrand competition occur because
advertising generates additional bene¯ts by reducing idiosyncratic risk and increasing
consumers' willingness to pay. The theoretical models and simulations con¯rm these
conclusions.
The results of this study are derived under the assumptions that the sources of un-
certainty come from the demand side, that any shock is proportional to revenue, that
demand is linear, and so on. These assumptions can be somewhat restrictive. Rea-
sonable generalizations should include supply shocks, the general impacts of shock,
and the general format of demand. In addition, this paper does not address the role
29of capital stock, Ki. Indeed, relaxing the assumption of ¯xed capital stock may raise
some relevant issues regarding risk management and the interplay of production and
capital structure. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that risk management
is important as an appropriate strategy to avoid unnecessary °uctuations in either
funds raised from outside investors or investment spending if the external sources
of ¯nance (for example, borrowing) are more costly than internally generated funds
(such as existing cash °ows). Second, while a ¯nancial variable like systematic risk is
a®ected by real variables of production, ¯nancial variables like ¯nancial structure or
the debt-equity ratio may have impacts on the product side as well. The in°uential
work is pioneered by Brander and Lewis (1986) who examine the strategic role of debt
with limited liability. It is worthwhile to incorporate additional ¯nancial concerns to
expand the current framework.
As mentioned above, one of most important issues addressed here is the role of
risk reduction. In addition to the advertising issues that we have addressed, our
observations further suggest that vehicles for risk reduction may include contracting,
R&D, growth options, and so on. Let us take \contracting" as an example. Imagine
that several downstream and upstream ¯rms exist in the industry. To reduce risk,
upstream ¯rms may seek contracts with downstream ¯rms so as to ensure a certain
level of sales before the uncertainty of demand is realized. Likewise, downstream
¯rms may have incentives to sign contracts with upstream ¯rms so as to ensure a
portion of their needed supply.19 In addition, those downstream or upstream ¯rms
may choose to merge horizontally or integrate vertically so as to achieve their common
goal: reducing risk. Risk reduction provides a di®erent perspective for analyzing the
boundary of a ¯rm as the transaction cost approach is familiar to most economists.
This research avenue is worthy of future study.
19Note that hold-up problems may impose additional costs on the risk reduction.
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33Table 2(a) Simulation Results { Changes in ¹
Bertrand Cournot
¹ A p X v ¯ A p X v ¯
0.00 0.5000 0.5521 0.4479 0.1834 0.6741 0.5000 0.5521 0.4479 0.1834 0.6741
0.01 0.4759 0.5410 0.4590 0.1822 0.6773 0.4720 0.5399 0.4601 0.1822 0.6776
0.02 0.4565 0.5317 0.4683 0.1810 0.6801 0.4430 0.5279 0.4721 0.1809 0.6813
0.03 0.4402 0.5236 0.4764 0.1798 0.6827 0.4133 0.5163 0.4837 0.1797 0.6851
0.04 0.4262 0.5164 0.4836 0.1786 0.6851 0.3836 0.5054 0.4946 0.1785 0.6889
0.05 0.4139 0.5099 0.4901 0.1775 0.6873 0.3547 0.4953 0.5047 0.1773 0.6925
0.06 0.4030 0.5039 0.4961 0.1764 0.6894 0.3273 0.4861 0.5139 0.1762 0.6960
0.07 0.3931 0.4985 0.5015 0.1754 0.6913 0.3019 0.4780 0.5220 0.1752 0.6993
0.08 0.3842 0.4934 0.5066 0.1744 0.6932 0.2786 0.4709 0.5291 0.1743 0.7022
0.09 0.3760 0.4887 0.5113 0.1734 0.6950 0.2576 0.4647 0.5353 0.1735 0.7049
0.10 0.3684 0.4842 0.5158 0.1724 0.6968 0.2388 0.4593 0.5407 0.1727 0.7073
0.11 0.3614 0.4800 0.5200 0.1715 0.6984 0.2221 0.4547 0.5453 0.1720 0.7094
0.12 0.3549 0.4761 0.5239 0.1706 0.7000 0.2072 0.4506 0.5494 0.1714 0.7113
0.13 0.3488 0.4723 0.5277 0.1697 0.7016 0.1939 0.4471 0.5529 0.1709 0.7130
0.14 0.3431 0.4687 0.5313 0.1688 0.7031 0.1820 0.4440 0.5560 0.1704 0.7145
0.15 0.3377 0.4653 0.5347 0.1680 0.7046 0.1714 0.4413 0.5587 0.1700 0.7159
0.16 0.3326 0.4620 0.5380 0.1672 0.7061 0.1618 0.4389 0.5611 0.1696 0.7171
0.17 0.3277 0.4589 0.5411 0.1664 0.7075 0.1532 0.4367 0.5633 0.1693 0.7182
0.18 0.3231 0.4558 0.5442 0.1656 0.7089 0.1454 0.4348 0.5652 0.1690 0.7192
0.19 0.3188 0.4529 0.5471 0.1648 0.7102 0.1383 0.4331 0.5669 0.1687 0.7201
0.20 0.3146 0.4501 0.5499 0.1640 0.7115 0.1318 0.4316 0.5684 0.1684 0.7209
1 b = 1, r = 0:05, c = 0:1, ¾m = 0:2, ¸ = 2, ¾e = 0:2, ½ = 0:5, and ® = 1.
2 The numbers with bold type indicate Bertrand ¯rms enjoy more ¯rm value than Cournot ¯rms.
Table 2(b) Simulation Results { Changes in ®
Bertrand Cournot
® A p X v ¯ A p X v ¯
0.5 0.2364 0.2312 0.2688 0.0284 0.9952 0.0528 0.2409 0.2591 0.0323 0.9634
0.6 0.2740 0.2797 0.3203 0.0476 0.8714 0.0824 0.2790 0.3210 0.0510 0.8726
0.7 0.3045 0.3297 0.3703 0.0717 0.7994 0.1175 0.3197 0.3803 0.0742 0.8112
0.8 0.3298 0.3807 0.4193 0.1006 0.7529 0.1567 0.3632 0.4368 0.1022 0.7668
0.9 0.3508 0.4323 0.4677 0.1342 0.7205 0.1981 0.4098 0.4902 0.1350 0.7333
1.0 0.3684 0.4842 0.5158 0.1724 0.6968 0.2388 0.4593 0.5407 0.1727 0.7073
1.1 0.3834 0.5364 0.5636 0.2154 0.6787 0.2766 0.5112 0.5888 0.2153 0.6868
1.2 0.3961 0.5886 0.6114 0.2629 0.6645 0.3097 0.5645 0.6355 0.2627 0.6706
1.3 0.4071 0.6408 0.6592 0.3151 0.6530 0.3378 0.6186 0.6814 0.3148 0.6576
1.4 0.4165 0.6930 0.7070 0.3720 0.6436 0.3610 0.6730 0.7270 0.3716 0.6470
1.5 0.4246 0.7452 0.7548 0.4334 0.6357 0.3801 0.7274 0.7726 0.4330 0.6383
1 b = 1, r = 0:05, c = 0:1, ¾m = 0:2, ¸ = 2, ¾e = 0:2, ½ = 0:5, and ¹ = 0:1.
2 The numbers with bold type indicate Bertrand ¯rms enjoy more ¯rm value than Cournot ¯rms.
Table 2(c) Simulation Results { Changes in ½
Bertrand Cournot
½ A p X v ¯ A p X v ¯
0.0 0.3721 0.4840 0.5160 0.1818 0.0000 0.2477 0.4594 0.5406 0.1820 0.0000
0.1 0.3714 0.4840 0.5160 0.1799 0.1337 0.2460 0.4593 0.5407 0.1801 0.1356
0.2 0.3706 0.4841 0.5159 0.1780 0.2701 0.2442 0.4593 0.5407 0.1783 0.2740
0.3 0.3699 0.4841 0.5159 0.1762 0.4094 0.2424 0.4593 0.5407 0.1764 0.4154
0.4 0.3692 0.4842 0.5158 0.1743 0.5516 0.2406 0.4593 0.5407 0.1746 0.5598
0.5 0.3684 0.4842 0.5158 0.1724 0.6968 0.2388 0.4593 0.5407 0.1727 0.7073
0.6 0.3677 0.4843 0.5157 0.1706 0.8451 0.2370 0.4593 0.5407 0.1709 0.8580
0.7 0.3669 0.4843 0.5157 0.1687 0.9966 0.2352 0.4594 0.5406 0.1690 1.0120
0.8 0.3662 0.4844 0.5156 0.1668 1.1514 0.2333 0.4594 0.5406 0.1672 1.1694
0.9 0.3654 0.4845 0.5155 0.1650 1.3096 0.2314 0.4594 0.5406 0.1653 1.3304
1.0 0.3646 0.4846 0.5154 0.1631 1.4714 0.2295 0.4595 0.5405 0.1635 1.4950
1 b = 1, r = 0:05, c = 0:1, ¾m = 0:2, ¸ = 2, ¾e = 0:2, ® = 1, and ¹ = 0:1.
34Table 2(d) Simulation Results { Changes in ¾e
Bertrand Cournot
¾e A p X v ¯ A p X v ¯
0.00 0.3721 0.4840 0.5160 0.1818 0.0000 0.2477 0.4594 0.5406 0.1820 0.0000
0.02 0.3717 0.4840 0.5160 0.1808 0.0665 0.2469 0.4593 0.5407 0.1810 0.0675
0.04 0.3714 0.4840 0.5160 0.1799 0.1337 0.2460 0.4593 0.5407 0.1801 0.1356
0.06 0.3710 0.4840 0.5160 0.1790 0.2016 0.2451 0.4593 0.5407 0.1792 0.2045
0.08 0.3706 0.4841 0.5159 0.1780 0.2701 0.2442 0.4593 0.5407 0.1783 0.2740
0.10 0.3703 0.4841 0.5159 0.1771 0.3394 0.2433 0.4593 0.5407 0.1773 0.3444
0.12 0.3699 0.4841 0.5159 0.1762 0.4094 0.2424 0.4593 0.5407 0.1764 0.4154
0.14 0.3696 0.4841 0.5159 0.1752 0.4801 0.2415 0.4593 0.5407 0.1755 0.4872
0.16 0.3692 0.4842 0.5158 0.1743 0.5516 0.2406 0.4593 0.5407 0.1746 0.5598
0.18 0.3688 0.4842 0.5158 0.1734 0.6238 0.2397 0.4593 0.5407 0.1736 0.6331
0.20 0.3684 0.4842 0.5158 0.1724 0.6968 0.2388 0.4593 0.5407 0.1727 0.7073
0.22 0.3681 0.4843 0.5157 0.1715 0.7705 0.2379 0.4593 0.5407 0.1718 0.7822
0.24 0.3677 0.4843 0.5157 0.1706 0.8451 0.2370 0.4593 0.5407 0.1709 0.8580
0.26 0.3673 0.4843 0.5157 0.1696 0.9204 0.2361 0.4593 0.5407 0.1699 0.9345
0.28 0.3669 0.4843 0.5157 0.1687 0.9966 0.2352 0.4594 0.5406 0.1690 1.0120
0.30 0.3665 0.4844 0.5156 0.1678 1.0735 0.2342 0.4594 0.5406 0.1681 1.0902
0.32 0.3662 0.4844 0.5156 0.1668 1.1514 0.2333 0.4594 0.5406 0.1672 1.1694
0.34 0.3658 0.4844 0.5156 0.1659 1.2301 0.2324 0.4594 0.5406 0.1663 1.2494
0.36 0.3654 0.4845 0.5155 0.1650 1.3096 0.2314 0.4594 0.5406 0.1653 1.3304
0.38 0.3650 0.4845 0.5155 0.1640 1.3900 0.2305 0.4594 0.5406 0.1644 1.4122
0.40 0.3646 0.4846 0.5154 0.1631 1.4714 0.2295 0.4595 0.5405 0.1635 1.4950
1 b = 1, r = 0:05, c = 0:1, ¾m = 0:2, ¸ = 2, ½ = 0:5, ® = 1, and ¹ = 0:1.
Table 2(e) Simulation Results { Changes in c
Bertrand Cournot
c A p X v ¯ A p X v ¯
0.00 0.3840 0.4344 0.5656 0.2173 0.5469 0.2780 0.4092 0.5908 0.2172 0.5469
0.01 0.3825 0.4393 0.5607 0.2126 0.5602 0.2743 0.4141 0.5859 0.2125 0.5610
0.02 0.3811 0.4443 0.5557 0.2079 0.5738 0.2706 0.4191 0.5809 0.2079 0.5755
0.03 0.3796 0.4493 0.5507 0.2033 0.5878 0.2668 0.4240 0.5760 0.2033 0.5904
0.04 0.3781 0.4543 0.5457 0.1987 0.6021 0.2629 0.4290 0.5710 0.1988 0.6057
0.05 0.3765 0.4593 0.5407 0.1942 0.6168 0.2590 0.4340 0.5660 0.1943 0.6215
0.06 0.3750 0.4643 0.5357 0.1898 0.6319 0.2550 0.4390 0.5610 0.1899 0.6377
0.07 0.3734 0.4693 0.5307 0.1854 0.6475 0.2510 0.4441 0.5559 0.1855 0.6543
0.08 0.3718 0.4742 0.5258 0.1810 0.6635 0.2470 0.4491 0.5509 0.1812 0.6715
0.09 0.3701 0.4792 0.5208 0.1767 0.6799 0.2429 0.4542 0.5458 0.1769 0.6891
0.10 0.3684 0.4842 0.5158 0.1724 0.6968 0.2388 0.4593 0.5407 0.1727 0.7073
0.11 0.3667 0.4892 0.5108 0.1682 0.7141 0.2347 0.4645 0.5355 0.1686 0.7260
0.12 0.3650 0.4942 0.5058 0.1641 0.7320 0.2305 0.4696 0.5304 0.1645 0.7452
0.13 0.3632 0.4992 0.5008 0.1600 0.7504 0.2263 0.4748 0.5252 0.1604 0.7651
0.14 0.3614 0.5042 0.4958 0.1559 0.7694 0.2221 0.4800 0.5200 0.1564 0.7855
0.15 0.3596 0.5092 0.4908 0.1519 0.7890 0.2178 0.4853 0.5147 0.1525 0.8066
0.16 0.3578 0.5142 0.4858 0.1480 0.8091 0.2136 0.4906 0.5094 0.1486 0.8283
0.17 0.3559 0.5192 0.4808 0.1441 0.8299 0.2093 0.4959 0.5041 0.1447 0.8507
0.18 0.3539 0.5243 0.4757 0.1402 0.8514 0.2050 0.5012 0.4988 0.1410 0.8737
0.19 0.3520 0.5293 0.4707 0.1364 0.8735 0.2007 0.5066 0.4934 0.1372 0.8975
0.20 0.3500 0.5343 0.4657 0.1327 0.8964 0.1963 0.5120 0.4880 0.1336 0.9221
1 b = 1, r = 0:05, ¾m = 0:2, ¸ = 2, ¾e = 0:2, ½ = 0:5, ® = 1, and ¹ = 0:1.
2 The numbers with bold type indicate Bertrand ¯rms enjoy more ¯rm value than Cournot ¯rms.
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Proof of Proposition 1


























































(2 + ±)2 [(® ¡ c) + (® ¡ d)](d ¡ c) · 0:

























































(2 ¡ ±)2 [(® ¡ c) + (® ¡ d)](d ¡ c) · 0:
Proof of Proposition 2






® + (1 + ±)d
2 + ±
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b(2 + ±)(2 ¡ ±)
· 0: (42)




















> 0; 8± 2 (0;1]:
The results of part (a) follow.



















(2 + ±)2(2 ¡ ±)2:
Because Á < 1 in the uncertain case, we know that ® ¡ d = ® ¡ c=Á < ® ¡ c and
Á(®¡d)2 < (®¡d)2 < (®¡c)2. Thus, j¢pj < j¢p¤j, j¢Xj < j¢X¤j, and j¢vj < j¢v¤j.
Proof of Lemma 1
(a) Using the fact that Aj = Ai in equilibrium and taking a derivative with respect






(3 ¡ 2Ai)2(3 ¡ 8Ai + 12A2
i)
(1 ¡ 2Ai)2 : (44)
It is easy to check that 3 ¡ 8Ai + 12A2
i > 1=3. Therefore, equation (44) is strictly
greater than 0 for all Ai 2 [0;0:5). This completes the proof for Cournot competition.






(1 + 2Ai)2(1 + 8Ai ¡ 12A2
i)
(1 ¡ 2Ai)2 ; (45)
1+8Ai ¡12A2
i ¸ 1; 8Ai 2 [0;0:5). As a result, equation (45) is strictly greater than
0 for all Ai 2 [0;0:5). Part (b) completes the proof for Bertrand competition.
Proof of Proposition 3
(a) Using the assumption that Aj = Ai and di®erentiating equation (22) with respect










37Using lemma 1 and ® > d, we have
@Ac
i
@® > 0. The parallel logic can be applied to




(b) Now, applying the relations in equation (24), we can easily obtain the results that
the left sides of equations (22) and (23) are increasing in ¾m but decreasing in b, ½¾e,
E(~ rm) ¡ r, c, and ¹.
(c) Following the similar steps in part (a) of the proof, it is straightforward to obtain
the remaining conclusions.
Proof of Lemma 2
(a) Under Cournot competition, di®erentiating b(2 + ±)ÁXc
i = (Á® ¡ c)(1 + ±) with
















As a result, ´c
xÁ is bounded above. For the price, (2 + ±)Ápc
















pÁ is bounded below. Moreover, ´c
xÁ < 0 (or
@Xc
i
@Á < 0) and ´c
pÁ > 0 (or
@pc
i
@Á > 0) if ´c
±Á ¿ 0 (or @±
@Á ¿ 0).
(b) From equation (47), taking a derivative with respect to Á, we get
(® + d)(® ¡ d)
b(1 + r)
(+)

















@Á > 0. We omit the proof for Bertrand competition because the
logic is the same.
Proof of Proposition 4
Rewrite equation (13) as b(2 + ±)Xc
i = (® ¡ d)(1 + ±) and (2 + ±)pc
i = ® + (1 + ±)d,































38It is easy to check that
@pc
i
@® > 0 because
@Ai
@® > 0 and pc
i ¸ d. The second term on the
right side of equation (46) is weakly greater than 0 because in equilibrium Xi = Xj:
Hence equation (3) becomes pc
i = ® ¡ bXc
i. Again, pc














(1 + ±)(2 + ±)
2(® ¡ d)
:

























































Under Bertrand competition, the results are the same as those for Cournot com-
petition except for the change of equilibrium quantity. From equation (16),
b(2 ¡ ±)X
B
i = ® ¡ d:







= (2 ¡ ±) + (® ¡ d)
@±
@®






















39Proof of Proposition 6




















Taking ½¾e as an example, from lemma 2, we get that
@Xi
@(½¾e) is bounded below
and
@pi
@(½¾e) is bounded above. Moreover,
@Xi
@(½¾e) > 0 and
@pi
@(½¾e) < 0 if @±




Let us examine how ¯ can be changed. By equation (15), di®erentiating with



















®(2 + ±)d0 + d(® ¡ d)±
0


























It turns out that
@¯c
@(½¾e) > 0.
For Bertrand competition, we omit the computations as the qualitative results are
the same.
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